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To begin to answer the question of whether every moral truth could be 
known by any one individual, this paper examines David Chalmers’ 
views on the scrutability of moral truths in Constructing the World. 
Chalmers deals with the question of the scrutability of moral truths ecu-
menically, claiming that moral truths are scrutable on all plausible me-
taethical views. I raise two objections to Chalmers’ approach. The fi rst 
objection is that he confl ates the claim that moral truths are scrutable 
from PQTI with the claim that moral truths are scrutable from non-
moral truths. The upshot of this objection is that Chalmers has not in 
fact shown the scrutability of moral truths from the scrutability base 
from which he proposed to do so, PQTI. The second objection concerns 
his handling of moral sensibility theory, which fails to take into account 
certain features of the emotions—features which generate what I term 
synchronic and diachronic emotional co-instantiation problems. The up-
shot of this objection is that we have good reason to deny that any one 
individual could ascertain all moral truths, if moral sensibility theory is 
true, no matter how idealized the emoter. 
Keywords: David Chalmers, moral sensibility theory, moral episte-
mology, moral psychology, philosophy of emotion.
1. Introduction
It seems many philosophers would agree that it is important to know 
moral truths. Some might think that knowing moral truths is impor-
tant for the purposes of correct moral behavior and moral evaluation of 
oneself and others, but others might allow that knowing moral truths 
is important as an end-in-itself; moral truths are the sorts of things 
that it is just good to know. This raises the question of whether there 
* For his comments on an earlier version of this paper thanks to Kevin Morris, 
and thanks to the reviewers.
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are any constraints on the moral truths any one individual could know. 
As the limiting-case, could any one individual could know every moral 
truth? In this paper I begin an investigation of this question by ex-
amining one infl uential epistemological proposal that has the upshot 
that all moral truths could be known; David Chalmers’ discussion of 
“scrutability” in Constructing the World. I fi rst outline Chalmers’ view 
that, on all plausible metaethical theories, moral truths are scrutable 
from PQTI. I then offer two objections. First, Chalmers confl ates the 
claim that moral truths are scrutable from PQTI with the claim that 
moral truths are scrutable from non-moral truths. Second, Chalmers’ 
discussion of moral sensibility theory fails to take into account certain 
features of the emotions which prevent any given person from ascer-
taining all moral truths—emotions generate what I term synchronic 
and diachronic emotional co-instantiation problems. I conclude that, on 
at least one infl uential metaethical theory, it is not possible for some-
one to know every moral truth.
2. Chalmers on Scrutability and Moral Truths
According to Chalmers, given certain truths a hypothetical ideal rea-
soner would be able to know certain other truths. The former truths 
would be a “scrutability base,” and the latter truths would be “scru-
table” from the former. Chalmers has in mind an epistemological ana-
logue to the idea of supervenience; just as facts of type x determine 
facts of type y, so too given truths of type x a hypothetical ideal reason-
er could know truths of type y. Chalmers suggests that all truths are 
scrutable from four classes of truths; physical truths (P), phenomenal 
truths (Q—qualia), indexical truths (I), and a “that’s all” sentence (T) 
(Chalmers 2012: 22).
To help illustrate the idea of scrutability, Chalmers uses two imagi-
native devices. One is the familiar idea of the Laplacean demon who, 
given a scrutability base consisting of all the truths about the present 
state of the universe, is able to scrute all the truths about the past 
and future states of the universe (Chalmers 2012: xiii–xv). The sec-
ond is the idea of a Cosmoscope, a device that contains and displays to 
its user all the truths contained in the scrutability base; “information 
about the distribution of matter…[and]… a virtual reality device to 
produce direct knowledge of any phenomenal states” (Chalmers 2012: 
114). Compared with the Laplacean demon, the Cosmoscope “simply 
offl oads some of the work [of calculation, of imagination] from ourselves 
onto the world” (Chalmers 2012: 116). Such a device “will deliver a 
sort of supermovie of the world” (Chalmers 2012: 118). So, according 
to Chalmers, someone using a Cosmoscope that displayed to them all 
the PQTI truths, would in principle—given suffi cient time—be able to 
ascertain all truths.
Not wishing to have to take on the burden of arguing for a specifi c 
ontological view about moral truths but wishing to argue that moral 
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truths are scrutable from PQTI, Chalmers notes the most infl uential 
types of views of the ontological status of moral truths. He then briefl y 
examines whether, on each of these types of views, moral truths are 
plausibly scrutable from PQTI. He notes fi ve types of view;
       1. Types of anti-realism.
       2. Types of moral relativism, in which “moral sentences are ad-
judged true insofar as they are true according to an appropriate 
standard (that of a speaker, or an assessor)” (Chalmers 2012: 
265).
       3. Types of moral realism based on a posteriori identities between 
non-moral and moral expressions.
       4. Types of moral sensibility theories on which one “must have a 
certain sensibility (certain emotional responses, say) in order to 
appreciate moral truths” (Chalmers 2012: 265).
       5. Types of moral realism in which “moral truths that are not 
knowable even on full knowledge of nonmoral truths and ideal 
refl ection” (Chalmers 2012: 266).
On (1), there are no moral truths to be scruted. On (2), moral truths 
are scrutable from social truths about the standards of the speaker. On 
(3), moral truths will be scrutable insofar as they are identifi able with 
certain non-moral truths, and insofar as we have access to the non-
moral truth that these non-moral truths regulate our positive moral 
responses (Chalmers 2012: 265). Chalmers suggests in relation to (4) 
that, if it is the right metaethical view, then the scruting process “may 
have less of a rationalist upshot than one might have supposed… ide-
al reasoning will require the right sensibility, involving components 
that one might take to be emotional as well as traditionally rational” 
(Chalmers 2012: 266). He claims that (5) is independently implausible 
because he supposes it to involve a problem of the knowability of moral 
truths, when “the best reason for being a moral realist stems precisely 
from our apparent knowledge of moral truths” (Chalmers 2012: 266). 
With this, Chalmers takes himself to have shown how moral truths, on 
the gamut of metaethical views, are plausibly scrutable from PQTI or, 
as with (5), why such metaethical views are implausible. 
3. Objection 1—The Confl ation of PQTI with Non-moral 
Truths
Chalmers confl ates the hypothesis that moral truths are scrutable 
from PQTI with the hypothesis that moral truths are scrutable from 
non-moral truths. He begins his discussion by noting that “One could 
ask the question: are moral truths scrutable from PQI? But it is easier 
to ask the more general question: are moral truths scrutable from non-
moral truths?” (Chalmers 2012: 264). If non-moral truth were synony-
mous with PQTI this would be unproblematic. But non-moral truth is 
a broader scrutability base than PQTI and includes the truths of the 
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numerous other “hard cases” that Chalmers discusses; mathematical 
truths, other normative and evaluative truths (epistemic and aesthet-
ic), ontological truths, modal truths, intentional truths, social truths, 
deferential terms, names, metalinguistic truths, indexicals and demon-
stratives, vague truths, truths about secondary qualities, and counter-
factual truths.
This confl ation is especially problematic because Chalmers seems to 
make similar confl ations with regards to some of his other hard cases. 
For instance, he suggests that “deferential truths are scrutable from 
nondeferential truths” (Chalmers 2012: 281) and that “metalinguis-
tic truths will be scrutable from nonmetalinguistic truths” (Chalmers 
2012: 285) rather than “x truths will be scrutable from PQTI.” In each 
case, it is questionable whether Chalmers is dialectically entitled to 
make use of all the “non-x truths” in scruting the “x truths,” and it 
might be that the scrutability of each hard case from PQTI rests on an 
assumption of the success of the scrutability of the other hard cases 
from PQTI, a disturbing circularity.
With regards to some of these other hard cases—such as names—
whether they can or cannot be scruted from PQTI—rather than “non-
name truths”—is unlikely to have any bearing on the question of the 
scrutability of moral truths from PQTI rather than from non-moral 
truths. However, with regards to some of the other hard cases, proving 
their scrutability from PQTI rather than from “non-x truths” does seem 
necessary to Chalmers’ discussions of the metaethical views on offer. 
To wit; it seems that the inscrutability of intentional truths from PQTI 
alone would impact upon the scrutability of moral truths on (2), on most 
forms of (3), and on (4), since these metaethical views typically suppose 
that one must have intentional states of various sorts in order to access 
moral truths. The inscrutability of social truths from PQTI would im-
pact upon the scrutability of moral truths on (2) and on some forms of 
(3), e.g. social truths about one’s role that ground associative or contrac-
tive moral duties. The inscrutability of normative epistemic and modal 
truths from PQTI would have sundry impacts. Therefore, proceeding 
immediately to the scruting of moral truths from PQTI alone, only on 
(1) do they remain obviously scrutable, an unremarkable conclusion.
4. Objection 2—Sensibility and Scrutability
Views falling under (4) refuse “the concession that values are not gen-
uine aspects of reality” (McDowell 1998: 143), and assert that moral 
claims are truth apt, but that they are not knowable by the more usual 
epistemological means. Rather, they are learned from emotional, af-
fective, and sentimental reactions. For simplicity of expression I will 
use the term “emotions” in subsequent discussion—this term should 
be understood loosely, as including a variety of affective states, senti-
ments, moods, feelings, and so forth. The person with refi ned moral 
emotions has “a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement 
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which situations impose on behaviour” (McDowell 1979: 331–332), and 
through their emotional reactions to various life-situations comes to 
learn moral truths. Views falling under (4) are by no means rare or 
niche; fl owering in the hands of British Enlightenment fi gures such as 
Adam Smith, David Hume, and the Earl of Shaftesbury, they remain 
important contemporary metaethical theories.
On (4), imperfect reasoners and imperfect emoters like us can often 
learn some moral truths by having the right sorts of emotional states 
in the various situations that we fi nd ourselves in. The question for 
Chalmers’ project is whether an ideal emoter—with “a big heart as 
well as a big brain” (Chalmers 2012: 266)—would be able to scrute all 
moral truths in this manner if they were to use the Cosmoscope to 
insert themselves into enough of the circumstances and perspectives 
in which the various the salient emotional states arise. I suggest that 
the answer to this question is “no.” I specify and give criticisms of the 
scrutability of moral truths on two differing understandings of the Cos-
moscope, before proceeding to some more general criticisms.
I explore two alternatives about what using a Cosmoscope would be 
like for the ideal emoter, since Chalmers’ account is ambiguous. Let’s 
call the fi rst possibility the engrossed option. On this option, the Cos-
moscope “will enable us to know just what it is like to be that subject” 
(Chalmers 2012: 275). That is, when using the Cosmoscope the user 
experiences a phenomenologically perfect reconstruction of someone 
else’s experience. The user is immersed in all and only the physical 
truths, phenomenal truths, and indexical truths that the original ex-
periencer had access to. For instance, if the user explored “what it was 
like to be Agamemnon in battle” they would have access to all and only 
the phenomena, and so on, that Agamemnon had. For this to happen 
it seems necessary that in the engrossed option the ordinary aspects of 
one’s own self such as one’s own memories, desires, beliefs, propriocep-
tion, etc., would be completely unavailable, on pain of one’s experience 
being phenomenologically unfaithful to Agamemnon’s.
In the alternative unengrossed option, the user retains their ordi-
nary sense of self even as they experience all the phenomena, and so 
on, of Agamemnon in battle. The unengrossed option is much easier 
to imagine. In the unengrossed case the user of the Cosmoscope has 
an experience of this event that is not quite faithful to Agamemnon’s 
experience, because they remain aware that they are in fact not in an-
cient Greece on a battlefi eld, but sat in a basement somewhere; there 
remains a doubleness of perspective that is absent in the engrossed 
option. In the unengrossed option the user is able to react to the expe-
riences given by the Cosmoscope from their own ordinary perspective. 
For instance, such a user would be able to think “How curious to see 
ancient Greece, and through the eyes of a Greek hero, whilst sat in 
this basement!,” which would not have been a thought available to one 
whose only perspective on the world was one patterned on Agamem-
non’s, as in the engrossed option.
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5. Criticism of the Engrossed Cosmoscope
It seems that there is a tension between the faculties of the ideal emot-
er and the engrossed-Cosmoscopic experience. Suppose that the ideal 
emoter uses the engrossed-Cosmoscope to experience “what it was like 
to be Vlad the Impaler.” Presumably an ideal emoter would look upon 
the impaled with emotions of horror, revulsion, disgust, and sadness. 
But to experience these emotions whilst using the Cosmoscope would 
mean that the ideal emoter’s experience of “what it was like to be Vlad 
the Impaler” would be very unfaithful to Vlad’s own experiences. This 
would mean that certain moral truths would be unavailable to them. 
For instance, let’s suppose that the real Vlad the Impaler grew less 
bloodthirsty for a time as he came under the sway of a pacifi st preach-
er—he became troubled, then rueful, then repentant, of his old ways. 
However, when he campaigns, he fi nds that he lapses back into violence 
with an especially wild abandon, and when he returns home becomes 
repentant again. Presumably, the ideal emoter’s responses to the Cos-
moscopic experiences would differ very drastically from the warps and 
wefts of Vlad’s very unideal emotional life, but in doing so would neces-
sarily miss out on much—in having nothing to repent of, in not know-
ing what it is like to take joy in moral violation, what it is like to repent 
of taking joy in moral violation, what it is like to be morally unstable, 
etc. On the other hand, if the emotional responses of the ideal emoter 
are absent, and only the emotional responses of various historical and 
future fi gures to their circumstances are present, it is unclear that all 
moral truths (the relevant standard for Chalmers’ project) would ever 
be revealed by use of the engrossed-Cosmoscope, since the user would 
only have access to a huge array of the unideal emotional responses 
of actual historical and future persons, lacking access to whatever the 
ideal emotional responses to their various situations were.
6. Criticism of the Unengrossed Cosmoscope
In discussing the Cosmoscope, Chalmers says that there are certain 
emotional states, for example of “anger or of stupor,” the entering of 
which “may undermine the capacity for reasoning” such that it is best 
to “think of the Cosmoscope as inducing imaginative states… without 
actually having those experiences” (Chalmers 2012: 116). On such a 
supposition, it seems that the user of the Cosmoscope would retain 
their own perspective whilst entertaining these imaginative states. It 
seems, prima facie, then, that the unengrossed option avoids my objec-
tions to the engrossed option.
However, on the unengrossed option it seems that the user of the 
Comoscope, even an ideal emoter, would not ever experience all the 
emotional states requisite for scruting all moral truths. Due to the 
presence of their own perspective assessing the deliverances of the Co-
moscope, the emotions the user experienced would not simply be copies 
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of the emotions experienced by the historical (and future) fi gures over 
whose shoulders they were peering. For example, take a case of righ-
teous indignation which reveals certain moral truths. It seems that 
for the user of the unengrossed-Cosmoscope vivid imaginings of the 
emotional states of the righteously-indignant would involve very differ-
ent emotional states than those occurent in the righteously-indignant 
themselves. The unengrossed user might admire the righteously-in-
dignant person or be inspired with a feeling of elevation by their ex-
ample. These emotions may indeed reveal moral truths, but not neces-
sarily the very same moral truths as the righteous-indignation. The 
righteously indignant person was presumably not self-admiring, nor 
inspired by their own example. Imagining the emotional states of oth-
ers and experiencing one’s own emotional reaction in response to these 
is clearly different than having the very emotional states to which one 
is reacting. There is therefore no guarantee that an ideal emoter would 
eventually be able to scrute all moral truths through the use of the 
unengrossed-Cosmoscope, gaining instead an enormous repository of 
their own emotional reactions to the emotional states of others.
A similar problem is that plausibly the unengrossed-Cosmoscope 
user would lack access to a host of moral emotions relating to the felt 
exercise of agency. For instance, for Agamemnon the faculty of acting 
and emoting were likely richly interwoven; the swinging of the blade is 
colored and aided by his righteous anger, which in turn is modifi ed and 
strengthened or satisfi ed by carrying out this action—the doing is es-
sential to the distinctive sort of emoting. Whilst an engrossed-Cosmo-
scope user could experience the illusion of this exercise of agency and 
the sentiments that arise in relation to it, an unengrossed-Cosmoscope 
user could not; at best being able to imagine what these states are like, 
as with any cinema-goer.
7. Moral Emotions and Co-instantiation Problems
I turn now to outlining some features of the emotions that, as well 
as constituting problems for Chalmers’ account, seem more broadly to 
pose impediments to any articulation of the claim that, on (4), any one 
individual could know every moral truth.
The nature of the emotions makes the idea of one person being able 
to know all moral truths impossible. To see this, compare the emotions 
with more squarely cognitive states such as belief. From our own expe-
rience we know that it is possible to entertain numerous beliefs at once. 
From our own experience we know that it is possible to have certain 
different emotional states at once; it seems we can feel both angry and 
sad at once. But it seems that certain emotional states are incompat-
ible and cannot be experienced simultaneously. For instance, it seems 
that one cannot feel both jovial and reverent, or feel both malicious 
and compassionate, simultaneously, even with regards to different ob-
jects. Moreover, even of emotional states that seem compatible when 
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only two or three of them are experienced simultaneously, it seems like 
there is an upper limit on the number of emotions we can experience 
simultaneously. For instance, though I can feel sad as well as feeling 
angry, or hopeless, or bitter, or detached, or self-pitying, or resigned, or 
bored, or afraid, it seems hard to imagine that someone could feel all 
of these simultaneously, even if nothing about any one of these emo-
tions seems to exclude experiencing any one of the others. From this, 
it seems impossible that one could experience every emotional state 
simultaneously, or, more weakly, that one could experience every emo-
tional state salient to scruting moral truths simultaneously. Let’s call 
this the synchronic emotional co-instantiation problem.
One question is whether the synchronic emotional co-instantiation 
problem is something contingent to human or non-ideal emoters, or 
something in the nature of emotional states themselves. It is hard to 
adduce a case in which something about “belief x” seems of its nature 
to exclude the simultaneous entertainment of “belief y.” It seems in the 
case of beliefs that our inability to have millions of occurrent beliefs all 
at once is merely a contingent fact about us. The impossibility of my 
having occurrent beliefs about “the ontological argument,” “the factors 
affecting the price of fi sh,” and “every capital of Africa” seems to be 
a limitation about me, rather than something to do with the nature 
of these beliefs or the nature of beliefs or concepts in general; “there 
are no concepts whose possession is mutually incompatible” (Chalmers 
2012: 114). So, there doesn’t seem to be a prima facie bar here to the 
idea of an ideal reasoner able to apprehend all beliefs, and so truths, 
at once. In the case of the emotions it seems that there is something 
about the phenomenological experience of certain emotional states that 
necessarily excludes the simultaneous experience of other emotional 
states, and about the nature of emotions which puts a cap on the num-
ber that can be experienced simultaneously. It is diffi cult to prove that 
this is not merely a contingent limitation of ours, but I offer three spec-
ulative indications for thinking that it is not.
A fi rst indication is given by the way in which, in ordinary experi-
ence, most emotions seem to modify one another. For example, rath-
er than saying that one has an emotion of joy and also an emotion of 
amazement that stand separately in the same phenomenological fi eld, 
it seems more accurate to say that one experiences a “joyful amaze-
ment” or an “amazed joy”—a single sort of compound or alloy-emotion. 
Our emotions themselves tend to blend with one another or contami-
nate one another. Were the emotions of an ideal emoter not to do this, 
we might plausibly say that the ideal emoter simply did not have the 
same sorts of emotions as us, and so perhaps was missing out on what-
ever class of moral truths our own alloy-emotions illuminate.
A second indication is that there is something confused about the 
idea of experiencing some emotions simultaneously on various theo-
ries of the purported constituent features of the emotions. According 
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to various theories, emotions necessarily or paradigmatically involve 
certain patterns of attention or interpretations of experiences (Roberts 
2003), certain judgements (Nussbaum 2004), or action tendencies (Fri-
jda 2008), or bodily feelings (James 1884). Take fear and “feeling safe.” 
It seems that one cannot both attend to and not attend to potential 
dangers, or endorse the constitutive judgements of fear and the feeling 
of safety at once (“The fearful is (not) present”). Likewise, the action 
tendency of fear and the feeling of safety seem opposed; being inclined 
to run away and to stay put. Likewise, the bodily feelings of the two are 
very different. For the constitutive features of one to be present means 
for the constitutive features of the other to be absent.
A third indication is given by the way in which we talk about emo-
tions as against more squarely cognitive states such as belief. John 
believes that Copernicus was Polish. Most of the time, this is a dispo-
sitional belief for John, very rarely becoming an occurrent belief. We 
nevertheless say of John at any given time that he believes that Coper-
nicus was Polish; it is a belief that we may say John has at any time of 
day. John also has the capacity to experience many different emotions. 
We talk about the frequency with which John experiences these vari-
ous emotions in terms of his dispositions, his traits, or his character; if 
he often gets angry he is an angry man. Nevertheless, it seems that we 
do not speak of these dispositions as being the emotional states them-
selves. The disposition explains or summarizes John’s frequent bouts 
of anger but is itself is not the anger. Whereas numerous items of dis-
positional belief can be said to co-exist in the same mind at once even 
when they are not called to attention, there seem to be no analogous 
“dispositional emotions” of which the same can be said. It would be bi-
zarre to say, for instance, that John has dispositional envy even though 
he hasn’t had an episode of envy for two years, whereas it makes sense 
to say that John has a dispositional belief that Copernicus was Polish 
even though this belief hasn’t become occurrent for two years.
To use a metaphor, beliefs are like tabs in a minimized computer 
window—they are there, even if you haven’t checked them in a while. 
Emotions are like the wavy patterns displayed by a 1990s screensaver; 
one is now displayed, the patterns that were displayed no longer exist, 
and the patterns that will be displayed do not exist yet, even though 
we can say which are likely to be displayed next, or which patterns are 
often displayed. If this observation is correct then its upshot is to rein-
force the fi rst two indications by showing that there is no way to sneak 
in “dispositional emotions” that are all somehow “had” by an emoter 
yet lie dormant and do not modify one another or prompt contradictory 
action tendencies, bodily feelings, etc.
One response to the synchronic emotional co-instantiation prob-
lem is to note that even if an ideal emoter could not experience every 
emotion at once, they are at any rate surely able to experience every 
emotion sequentially. Once a suffi ciently long series of the appropri-
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ate emotions have been experienced, these emotional reactions will 
have scruted every moral truth. Against this, I suggest instead three 
reasons for thinking that there is also a diachronic emotional co-in-
stantiation problem—meaning that it seems impossible that one could 
experience every emotional state sequentially, or, more weakly, that 
one could experience every emotional state salient to scruting moral 
truths sequentially.
First, some emotional episodes alter our characters, tending to give 
rise to recurring emotional episodes, or staining a broad spectrum of 
future emotional episodes in very specifi c ways. That some emotional 
episodes have this effect is an important aspect of the moral truths 
they seem to reveal (or hide). As well as making the idea of learning 
moral truths by sequentially undergoing differing emotional experi-
ences overly simplistic, this fact plausibly excludes the learning of ev-
ery moral truth by any given individual. The person whose character 
develops in one particular direction may not be able to access the moral 
truths learned by someone whose character develops in a very different 
direction.
Second, it would be a mistake to think that every given moral truth 
can be revealed by a single episode of an emotion. Rather, certain moral 
truths may only be learned through repeated emotional episodes and 
through complex patterns of emotional episodes.
Third, the memory of an emotional episode is not the same as ex-
periencing the emotional episode itself. Whilst, plausibly, most moral 
truths are such that they can be revealed by an emotional reaction and 
then recorded by the memory, plausibly not all moral truths are like 
this. Some moral truths may be revealed in an emotional reaction but 
not admit of being added to a permanent stock of belief or knowledge, 
being instead temporary and situational. For instance, it is plausibly 
only during the-moment-at-which-you-think-you-will-now-die or only 
during the religious experience or only during the DMT-trip that you 
could be said to fully grasp the moral truths that the emotional aspects 
of these experiences conveyed.
To illustrate these points three I give two literary examples. First, 
the character des Esseintes from Joris-Karl Huysmans’ Against Nature 
explaining his motivations for bringing a young boy to a brothel:
… I’m simply trying to make a murderer of the boy. See if you can follow 
my line of argument. The lad’s a virgin and he’s reached the age where the 
blood starts coming to the boil. He could, of course, just run after the little 
girls of his neighbourhood, stay decent and still have his bit of fun, enjoy his 
little share of the tedious happiness open to the poor. But by bringing him 
here, by plunging him into luxury such as he’s never known and will never 
forget, and by giving him the same treat every fortnight, I hope to get him 
into the habit of these pleasures which he can’t afford. Assuming that it will 
take three months for them to become absolutely indispensable to him—and 
by spacing them out as I do, I avoid the risk of jading his appetite—well, at 
the end of those three months, I stop the little allowance. I’m going to pay 
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you in advance for being nice to the boy. And to get the money to pay for 
his visits here, he’ll turn burglar, he’ll do anything if it helps him on to one 
of your divans in one of your gaslit rooms... I shall have contributed, to the 
best of my ability, to the making of a scoundrel, one enemy the more for the 
hideous society which is bleeding us white. (Huysmans 2003: 66)
And, from Friedrich Hölderlin’s Hyperion:
I know as well as you do that I could still trump up some kind of existence 
for myself, could, now that life’s meal is eaten, still sit playing with the 
crumbs; but that is not for me, nor for you. Need I say more? (Hölderlin 
1990: 116)
It seems that the emotional reactions of des Esseintes’ boy-victim would 
cascade throughout his life in complex ways. Plausibly, he would learn 
moral truths unavailable to someone who enjoyed a life of voluntary 
celibacy, and likewise the moral truths learned by the celibate would 
be unavailable to this boy. Similarly, it seems that the sentiments of 
Hölderlin’s character are provoked by an entire life of varied experi-
ences, will color the remainder of their life, and could not be viscerally 
experienced by, say, a young person who faces a terminal illness and 
is eager to eat as much of “life’s meal” as they can. Importantly, note 
that simply reading about these characters, or receiving testimony of 
the experiences of real people, although no doubt crucial for learning 
many moral truths, are not completely adequate substitutes for having 
these experiences; although readers may be able to imagine something 
of what it would be like to be des Esseintes’ boy-victim, there is surely 
much we cannot begin to grasp.
Lastly, some hold that different sorts of emotions are appropriate 
for those of different ages, professions, genders, without any given con-
stellation of emotional responses being better or worse or more com-
plete (Grimshaw 1993, Smith 2002). The concept of an ideal emoter is 
therefore indeterminate, admitting of multiple differing instantiations, 
in a way that the concept of an ideal reasoner is presumably not. For 
instance, Seneca writes:
It is a matter of great prudence, for the benefactor to suit the benefi t to the 
condition of the receiver: who must be either his superior, his inferior, or 
his equal; and that which would be the highest obligation imaginable to the 
one, would perhaps be as great a mockery and affront to the other (Seneca 
1882: 44).
One and the same emoter cannot be the superior, the inferior, and the 
equal, of the gift giver, and so cannot experience the emotions appropri-
ate to each station in life.
8. Conclusion
It seems that not even an ideal emoter with a Cosmoscope would be in 
a position to scrute all moral truths if (4) is true, due to the synchronic 
and diachronic emotional co-instantiation problems. Whereas there 
seems nothing in-principle impossible about the idea of a single person 
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having access to all the other sorts of truths, moral truths are a spe-
cial case. If an ideal emoter, with Cosmoscopic access to all the PQTI 
truths—or, to widen the scrutability-base beyond Chalmers’ claim, all 
non-moral truths—could not scrute all moral truths, then a fortiori 
non-ideal emoters without Cosmoscopic access to these truths could 
not scrute all moral truths.
For his own purposes, Chalmers might not be too bothered by this 
conclusion, since despite the co-instantiation problems, it might still be 
the case that although no individual could scrute every moral truth on 
(4), the human community might be able to scrute every moral truth, 
these truths being known in a disaggregated way by millions of indi-
viduals, each having a sliver of these truths—just as presumably no 
individual will ever know everything there is to know about chemis-
try and anthropology, but the human community or an ideal reasoner 
might. For our purposes, however, it is a signifi cant result that on (4) 
not every moral truth can be known by a given individual, even an 
ideal emoter. It is presumably not at all troubling that each of us is 
not able to know every truth about chemistry. A dispersion of knowl-
edge and a division of intellectual labour is both inevitable and useful. 
There are lots of crucial chemical and anthropological truths that it 
is probably important only that a few people know, and there are lots 
of trivial chemical and anthropological truths that it is probably not 
important that anyone know. However, it is potentially troubling that 
each of us is not able to know every moral truth because we tend to 
think that knowing about moral truths is each individual’s business, 
whatever else they wish to know or do, and that no moral truth is too 
trivial that it is not worth knowing since it is very important that we 
always behave permissibly and that we properly evaluate the behavior 
of ourselves and others.
The fi nding that, on (4), any one individual cannot know every mor-
al truth, should give us pause to consider what the proper ends of moral 
inquiry and moral learning may be; perhaps we should come to think 
that only knowing certain moral truths is our business, or that some 
moral truths are too trivial to be worth knowing. We should also pause 
to consider how this conclusion bears on our moral evaluations of oth-
ers; if ignorance of a moral truth can be a moral excuse, and if we are 
all necessary ignorant of some moral truths, then we all enjoy slightly 
differing sets of moral excuses, excuses which in turn it may be very 
diffi cult for one another to know about. 
I note that my conclusions here are limited in their extent in that 
further work is necessary to fi nd out whether any individual can know 
every moral truth on other metaethical theories.
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